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Abstract:   This paper aims to establish guidelines for public pension reform in Japan, using a 
numerical  simulation  approach. The  paper  introduces  the  example  of  a  minimum 
guaranteed pension in the Swedish pension system and compares this with the basic 
pension in Japan’s public pension system, with regard to methods of income redistribution 
through a public pension scheme. Simulation results show that the switch from the basic 
pension to the guaranteed pension does not always generate favorable results. If we 
consider a public pension program with the same scale as the current Japanese program, 
the highest level of social welfare is attained when a public pension system consists of 
only a basic pension and is financed by a consumption tax.
I. INTRODUCTION
With a population that is rapidly aging, Japan faces serious public finance problems, particularly 
when it comes to tax and social security issues. Structural reforms are urgently needed to 
accommodate the impending demographic change. In particular, the sustainability of the public 
pension system is an important problem, and thus a reform of the public pension program was 
implemented in 2004 in Japan. However, this reform seems to be far from a radical reform. 
Hence, it was unable to dispel completely the suspicion with which the people view the public 
pension scheme. The necessity for a more drastic reform of the scheme is now becoming obvious.
The new Swedish pension system has attracted attention around world as a good example 
for pension reform. The public pension program in Sweden was drastically reformed in 1999. 
The program includes a fixed contribution rate, a one-to-one relation between contributions 
paid and pension credit awarded, and an automatic balancing mechanism for pension benefits 
to take account of changes in economic growth rates and life expectancy.1 Thus, the system 
offers many interesting suggestions for dealing with the problems of intergenerational disparity 
and for maintaining sound pension finance. The current Japanese public pension scheme 
has already partially adopted the Swedish pension system. For instance, a fixed contribution 
program and a mechanism for the automatic adjustment of benefits were newly introduced 
by Japan’s 2004 pension reform.
1  See National Social Insurance Board in Sweden (2002) or Settergren (2001, 2005) for further details of the 
Swedish pension system.PUBLIC PENSION REFORM IN JAPAN 
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Although the Swedish pension system has many characteristics, this paper focuses on the 
fact that the system consists of an earnings-related pension and a minimum guaranteed pension. 
The earnings-related pension scheme has a one-to-one relation between contributions paid and 
pension credit awarded. The guaranteed pension is paid only to those with a low earnings-
related pension benefit, and it is financed not by contributions but general tax revenue. In the 
current Japanese public pension program, the basic pension performs the function of income 
redistribution. This paper investigates whether it would enhance overall social welfare in Japan 
to switch from the current basic pension paid to everyone, rich and poor, to the minimum 
guaranteed pension adopted in Sweden.
Intuitively, one would expect the move to the earnings-related pension with a minimum 
guaranteed pension to promote economic growth, because the absence of income redistribution 
for the medium and high-income classes in this scheme is likely to stimulate the labor supply. 
In other words, the switch to the Sweden-type system is likely to enhance overall economic 
efficiency. Moreover, income redistribution may be implemented with greater equity under a 
minimum guaranteed pension than under a basic pension, because the guaranteed pension is 
paid only to the low-income class.
This paper examines whether the move from the current Japanese pension system to 
the Sweden-type system improves social welfare. Also, the paper compares a basic pension 
and a minimum guaranteed pension as methods of income redistribution. It also investigates 
the effects of different payment levels of the basic pension and the guaranteed pension, and 
examines different financial methods to adjust the accompanying changes in tax transfer to the 
pension sector. Furthermore, it explores what would make a desirable public pension scheme 
in Japan, and thus presents a concrete policy suggestion for pension reforms. 
To analyze the problem, this paper looks at the Japanese tax and social security systems 
using an extended life-cycle general equilibrium model. Many papers have studied tax reforms 
using this kind of model; for instance, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983a, 1983b, 1987), Seidman 
(1983), Auerbach et al. (1989), Altig et al. (2001), Homma et al. (1987), and Ihori et al. 
(2006). Nearly all of them, however, have concentrated on analyzing the effects of an aging 
population on production and consumption, and thus on economic growth; but when dealing 
with pension reforms it is vital to evaluate not only efficiency but also equity.
This paper incorporates three representative households with different earnings abilities 
in a life-cycle model of overlapping generations with an elastic labor supply.2 This enables us 
to examine equity issues in addition to efficiency issues. Thus, we are able to present some 
comprehensive and useful guidelines for pension reform. The macroeconomic and welfare 
effects of alternative pension policies are evaluated in the steady state with the 2005 age 
structure in Japan.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section identifies the basic model employed in 
the simulation analysis. Section 3 explains the method of simulation analysis and the assumptions 
adopted. Section 4 evaluates the simulation findings and discusses policy implications. Section 
5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2  Okamoto (2005a) also incorporated three representative households with different earnings abilities. Altig 
et al. (2001) dealt with differences of lifetime earnings ability by incorporating 12 lifetime-income groups 
into a life-cycle model. Furthermore, Okamoto (2005b) introduced numerous representative households with 
continuous income distribution in each cohort.AKIRA OKAMOTO
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The life-cycle growth model employed in this paper is grounded in the microeconomics of 
intertemporal choice, and the macroeconomics of savings and growth. The simulation model 
has three features. First, aggregate assets of the economy in each period consist of the assets of 
different generations that maximize their lifetime utility. This allows us to rigorously analyze 
changes in the supply of assets caused by demographic changes. Second, assets in the capital 
market, where aggregate assets appear as real capital, affect the production level. Third, it is 
possible to estimate realistic consumption-savings profiles for the elderly, by incorporating 
life-length uncertainty and unintended bequests into the model.
We calibrate the simulation of the Japanese economy by employing population data estimated 
by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research in 2002. The model has 
75 different overlapping generations. Three types of agents are considered: households, firms, 
and the government. The basic structure of households is as follows.
2.1 Household Behaviour
Households are divided into three income classes: low, medium, and high. A single household 
type represents each income class. Each household has the same mortality rate and the same 
utility function. Unequal labor endowments, however, create different income levels. Each 
household appears in the economy as a decision-making unit at the age of 21 and lives to 
a maximum of 95. Households face an age-dependent probability of death. Let qj+1|j be the 
conditional probability that a household of age j lives to j + 1. Then the probability of a 
household of age 21 surviving until s can be expressed by
.
€ 
ps = q j+1| j
j=21
s−1
∏   .  (1)
The probability qj+1|j is calculated from data estimated by the National Institute of Population 
and Social Security Research (2002).
The utility of each household depends on the levels of consumption and leisure. Each 
household works from age 21 to a maximum of RE, the compulsory retirement age. The labor 
supply is elastic but zero after (voluntary or compulsory) retirement. Each household that 
maximizes the expected lifetime utility makes lifetime decisions at age 21, concerning the 
choice between leisure and labor supply and the allocation of wealth between consumption 
and savings. The utility function of a representative household of income class i, the form of 
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where Cs
i represents consumption (or expenditure) at age s, ls
i leisure at age s, φ the utility 
weight on leisure, δ the adjustment coefficient for discounting the future, γ the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution in the consumption/leisure composite, and р is the intratemporal PUBLIC PENSION REFORM IN JAPAN 
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elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure. The superscript i(= l, m, h) stands 
for low, medium, and high-income classes, respectively.
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 represents the amount of assets held by the household at the beginning of age s, r the 
interest rate, w the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor, and es is the age profile of earnings 
ability.3 1 – ls











i   is the amount of bequest to be inherited at age s, τw{wxies(1–li
s)} is the tax rate on labor 
income, τc that on consumption, τr that on interest income, and τp is the contribution rate to 
the public pension scheme. xi is the weight coefficient corresponding to the different levels 
of labor endowments across the three income classes.
The tax system consists of labor income, interest income, consumption, and inheritance 
taxes. Labor income is progressively taxed. The progressive tax schedule is incorporated in the 
same manner as in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). If the tax base is wxies(1 – li
s), we choose 
two parameters labeled α and β, and set the average tax rate τw equal to α + 0.5β{wxies(1 – li
s)} 
for all values of wxies(1 – li
s). The corresponding marginal tax rate τw is α + β{wxies(1 –li
s)}. 
Setting β=0 amounts to proportional taxation. One may make the tax system more progressive, 
holding revenue constant, by increasing β and decreasing α simultaneously. The symbol 
τw{wxies(1–li
s)} in equation (3) means that τw is a function of wxies(1–li
s). The tax systems on 
interest income, consumption, and inheritances are proportional.
The public pension program is assumed to be a pay-as-you-go system that is close to the 
current Japanese system. The program consists of the basic pension (i.e., the flat part) and 
a part proportional to the average annual income from labor for each household. Variables 
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the age at which each household starts to receive public pension benefit is ST, the average 
annual income from labor for each income class is    , RHi (21 ≤ RHi ≤ RE) is the 
3  To estimate the age profile of earnings ability, es, the following equation is employed:
  Q = a0 + a1A + a2A2 + a3L + a4L2
  where Q denotes average monthly cash earnings, A age, and L the length of one’s service for all workers. Table 
9 presents the parameter values estimated using data in the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (2005a). 
Because bonuses account for a large part of earnings in Japan, monthly cash earnings used here contain bonuses.
4  We conduct simulations for RHi = 21, 22ç RE. Then we choose the retirement age at which the utility of 
income class i is maximized.AKIRA OKAMOTO
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voluntary retirement age,4 the basic pension benefit per representative household is f, and 
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)   signifies that the amount 
of public pension benefit is a function of leisure, ls
i.
There are accidental bequests caused by uncertainty over the length of life. The bequests, 




i   is positive if and only if s = 50, and otherwise is zero. The inheritance 
is transferred within the same income class. When BQi
t is the sum of bequests inherited by 
50-year-old households at period t, 
€ 
a50
i  is defined by
  ,  (6)
where
BQt





∑ .  (7)
Nt is the number of new households entering the economy for each income class as decision-
making units at period t, n is the common (gross) growth rate of successive cohorts, and τh is 
the tax rate on inheritances of bequests. In the steady state of a life-cycle growth model, the 
amount of inheritances received is linked to the age profile of assets chosen by each household.
When we consider the utility maximization problem over time for each income class, in 
addition to the flow budget constraint represented by equation (3), the following constraint 
is imposed:
  .  (8)
This is a constraint that labor supply is nonnegative, and that each household invariably retires 
after the compulsory retirement age RE.
Let us consider the case in which each household maximizes expected lifetime utility under 
two constraints. Each household maximizes equation (2) subject to equations (3) and (8) (see 
Appendix A.1). From the utility maximization problem, the equation expressing evolutions of 
the consumption/leisure composite over time for each household is characterized by
  ,   (9)
where 
  .   (10) 
If the initial level, V21
i , is specified, the level of each age, Vs
i, can be derived from equation (9). 
If Vs
i is specified, the levels of consumption, Cs
i, and leisure, ls
i, at each age are obtained. The 
amount of assets held by each household at each age can be obtained from equation (3). The PUBLIC PENSION REFORM IN JAPAN 
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expected lifetime utility of each household is derived from equation (2).
The social welfare function, which takes account of different earnings abilities and thus 
provides different levels of consumption and leisure, is given by
SW = Ul + Um + Uh.  (11)
This function includes the aspects of both efficiency and equity. It is derived from a summation 
of the expected lifetime utilities at age 21 for the three income classes. When comparing steady 
states, it is not necessary to take account of the utilities of all overlapping generations existing 
at period t. A comparison of the lifetime utility of a single cohort is sufficient, because our 
aim is to compare the welfare level among simulation cases with alternative pension policies. 
The social welfare function is of the “Benthamite type,” but depends greatly on the utility 
of the low-income class.5 It is maximized if all income classes have the same level of the 
consumption/leisure composite.
With regard to the basic structure of firms, a single production sector is assumed to 
behave competitively using capital and labor, subject to a constant-returns-to-scale production 
function. See Appendix B for the basic structures of firms and the government, and market 
equilibrium conditions.
III. SIMULATION ANALYSIS
3.1 Method of Simulation
The simulation model presented in the previous section is solved under the hypothesis of 
perfect foresight by households that correctly anticipate the interest, wage, tax, and contribution 
rates. If the tax and public pension systems are determined, the model can be solved using 
the Gauss-Seidel method (see Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) for the computation process).
3.2 Simulation Cases
This paper examines the effects of alternative pension policies on efficiency and equity in the 
2005 current steady state. With regard to establishing parameters in the simulation cases, we 
make the total amount of public pension benefit fixed across cases to eliminate the effects 
of different pension size on the simulation results.6 Tax revenue neutrality is also assumed 
in order to allow a clearer evaluation of the effects of alternative pension policies. In all the 
simulation cases in our study, we hold that tax revenue is constant. The method we use is as 
5  The model employs a simple utilitarian social welfare function based on the steady state utility for a single 
generation. The function is most sensitive to income changes for the low-income class due to the concavity 
of the underlying utility function. As the parameter of intertemporal elasticity of substitution, y, is lower, it 
depends more on the welfare of the low-income class. It becomes Rawlsian if SW = Ul.
6  Under the hypothesis of perfect foresight by households, as in our simulation model, the level of social welfare 
is higher in the case without a pension scheme than in the case with a pension scheme. This is because, in the 
absence of a pension program, households that maximize their lifetime utility save relatively more to cover 
living expenses after retirement. This promotes capital accumulation, and thus enhances national income. 
However, a pension system has a variety of advantages that cannot be evaluated by a model analysis with 
perfect foresight. For example, one of the merits of a pension system often cited is that one can make provision 
for various uncertainties in the future and thus obtain a sense of security.AKIRA OKAMOTO
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follows. Government expenditure per representative household (g) is exogenously given and 
fixed. Because the scale of the population is the same across all cases, government expenditure 
(Gt) is also exogenous and constant.
Case A is the current benchmark for 2005. We choose parameter values that are realistic for 
the Japanese economy. The public pension program consists of a basic pension and an amount 
proportional to the average annual income from labor for each household. Along the lines of 
the current Japanese system, general tax revenue covers one third of the flat basic pension, 
and contributions cover both the remaining two thirds and the overall proportional part (see 
Figure 1 for diagrams of the public pension system in each simulation case).
If the Sweden-type public pension system is introduced, then the basic model presented in 
Section 2 and Appendix B is modified as follows (see Appendix A.2 for the utility maximization 
problem for each income class, under the Sweden-type pension scheme). In the Sweden-type 
pension program, a minimum guaranteed pension, b, is introduced instead of a basic pension. 
By a minimum guaranteed pension, the low-income class is guaranteed the same amount of 
public pension benefit as the medium-income class. General tax revenue covers the balance, 
St, between the earnings-related pension benefit of the low-income class and the guaranteed 
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The budget constraint of the narrower government sector at time t is defined by
Tt = Gt + St,  (B3)’
where 
€ 










The budget constraint of the public pension sector at time t is represented by
Rt = Pt,  (B4)’
In Cases B and C, the Sweden-type pension program is introduced. The switch from the current 
Japanese pension scheme (Case A) to the Sweden-type pension scheme (Cases B and C) 
changes the amount of the tax transferred from the narrower government sector to the pension 
sector. In Case B, the accompanied change in the tax revenue is adjusted by a consumption 
tax. In Case C, it is adjusted by an interest income tax (see Tables 1 and 2 for the setting and 
simulation results for Cases A, B, and C).
Next, in Cases B and C, we investigate the effects of the move from a minimum guaranteed 
pension to a flat basic pension. Here, we compare a guaranteed pension and a basic pension 
as methods of income redistribution through a public pension system. Keeping the weight 
coefficient, θ given to the average annual income from labor the same as in Cases B and C, the PUBLIC PENSION REFORM IN JAPAN 
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switch from a guaranteed pension to a basic pension is implemented, which gives Cases B-1 
and C-1, respectively. Additionally, in Cases B and C, a guaranteed pension is abolished, and 
thus there exists only an earnings-related pension, which yields Cases B-2 and C-2, respectively 
(see Tables 3 and 4 for the setting and simulation results for Cases B-1, B-2, C-1, and C-2).
In Cases B-1 and C-1 the size of a basic pension is chosen to maximize social welfare, 
which gives Cases B-1* and C-1*, respectively. Moreover, for the simplicity of discussion, 
this paper assumes that the minimum guaranteed pension benefit for the low-income class is 
equal to the earnings-related pension benefit for the medium-income class. We evaluate the 
effects of different levels of the guaranteed pension benefit on simulation results. In Cases B 
and C the amount of the guaranteed pension benefit is decreased to 80% of the amount of the 
earnings-related pension benefit for the medium-income class, which yields Cases B-3 and 
C-3, respectively (see Tables 5 and 6 for the setting and simulation results for Cases B-1*, 
B-3, C-1*, and C-3). The following eleven simulation cases are now considered.
1) Case A (Benchmark of the 2005 current state)
The tax system on labor income has a realistic progressiveness, with an average tax rate of 
7.44%. Tax rates on consumption, interest income, and inheritances are 5%, 20%, and 10%, 
respectively. Along the lines of the current Japanese public pension system, the general tax 
revenue covers one third of the basic pension.
2) Case B (Sweden-type pension system and a consumption tax) 
In Case A, a minimum guaranteed pension is introduced instead of a basic pension. The low-
income class is guaranteed the same level of pension benefit as the earnings-related pension 
benefit for the medium-income class. The accompanying change in tax revenue is adjusted 
by a consumption tax.
3) Case C (Sweden-type pension system and an interest income tax) 
In Case A, a minimum guaranteed pension is introduced instead of a basic pension. The low-
income class is guaranteed the same level of pension benefit as the earnings-related pension 
benefit for the medium-income class. The accompanying change in tax revenue is adjusted 
by an interest income tax.
4) Case B-1 (Basic pension and a consumption tax) 
In Case B, keeping the weight coefficient given to the average annual income from labor 
constant, a basic pension is incorporated instead of a minimum guaranteed pension. The 
accompanying change in tax revenue is adjusted by a consumption tax.
5) Case C-1 (Basic pension and an interest income tax) 
In Case C, keeping the weight coefficient given to the average annual income from labor 
constant, a basic pension is incorporated instead of a minimum guaranteed pension. The 
accompanying change in tax revenue is adjusted by an interest income tax.
6) Case B-2 (Earnings-related pension and a consumption tax) 
In Case B, a minimum guaranteed pension is abolished, and thus there exists only an earnings-
related pension. The accompanying change in tax revenue is adjusted by a consumption tax.PUBLIC PENSION REFORM IN JAPAN 
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7) Case C-2 (Earnings-related pension and an interest income tax) 
In Case C, a minimum guaranteed pension is abolished, and thus there exists only an earnings-
related pension. The accompanying change in tax revenue is adjusted by an interest income tax.
8) Case B-1* (Optimal size of basic pension and a consumption tax) 
In Case B-1, the size of a basic pension is chosen to maximize social welfare. The accompanying 
change in tax revenue is adjusted by a consumption tax.
9) Case C-1* (Optimal size of basic pension and an interest income tax) 
In Case C-1, the size of a basic pension is chosen to maximize social welfare. The accompanying 
change in tax revenue is adjusted by an interest income tax.
10) Case B-3 (Decreased guaranteed pension and a consumption tax) 
In Case B, the amount of minimum guaranteed pension benefit is decreased. The low-income 
class is guaranteed 80% of the amount of the earnings-related pension benefit for the medium-
income class. The accompanying change in tax revenue is adjusted by a consumption tax.
11) Case C-3 (Decreased guaranteed pension and an interest income tax) 
In Case C, the amount of minimum guaranteed pension benefit is decreased. The low-income 
class is guaranteed 80% of the amount of the earnings-related pension benefit for the medium-
income class. The accompanying change in tax revenue is adjusted by an interest income tax.
3.3 Specification of Parameters
This paper examines the implications of several pension policies for the Japanese economy 
through comparing steady states. We choose parameter values that are realistic for the economy. 
Therefore, the values of the economic variables in Case A, such as the ratio of capital to labor 
(K ⁄ L), are close to those that are suggested by the Economic and Social Research Institute 
(2005). Parameter values are assigned with reference to empirical research, Hatano and Yamada 
(2007) in which the values are estimated using Japanese data. The parameter values used in 
the benchmark simulation are given in Table 7.
First, survival probabilities (ps) are calculated from the National Institute of Population 
and Social Security Research (2002). Our model makes no distinction by sex, and thus this 
study uses male–female average values for 2005. Based on this data, the percentage of the aged 
population (65 or over) in the total population (21 or over) is 24.90% in 2005. The common 
growth rate of successive cohorts (n) is chosen so that the percentage in the simulation equals 
the estimated value.
Second, we choose the utility function’s leisure intensity parameter such that, on average, 
the medium-income class devotes approximately 50% of the available time endowment (of 
16 hours per day) to labor during working years (roughly ages 21-61) in Case A.
Third, the method of assigning the weight given to labor endowments for the three income 
classes is explained. Table 8 shows the data from the Ministry of Finance (2005). This table 
presents the effective tax rates of wageworkers on a national income tax and a residence tax, 
with regard to a couple with two children. In our model, the three representative households, 
namely, low, medium, and high-income classes, have different earnings abilities. Table 8 suggests AKIRA OKAMOTO
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that each income class, which accounts for one third of the total population, corresponds to the 
representative household earning 5, 7, or 10 million yen, respectively, on an annual base. The 
weight on labor endowments for each income class corresponds to the ratio of its amount of 
earned income. The medium-income class is used as a yardstick, that is, xm = 1; xl and xh are 
assigned to reflect different earnings abilities across the three income classes.
Fourth, the method of assigning the parameter values that determine tax progressivity on 
labor income, namely, α and β, is described. Table 8 presents the effective tax rate calculated 
from a national income tax and a residence tax for each income class. The parameters on labor 
income are chosen so that the effective tax rate for each income class in the simulation is close 
to the estimated value, and that the average tax rate on labor income is the value suggested 
by this data (7.44%).
Finally, the public pension benefits consist of a basic pension and a part proportional to the 
income from labor for each income class. Under the current Japanese system, the general tax 
revenue covers one third of the flat part, and contributions cover both the remaining two thirds 
and the overall part proportional to the income from labor. Hence, the ratio of the part covered 
by taxes (μ) in the basic pension is assigned to 1/3 in Case A.7 The basic pension benefit per 
representative household (f) is chosen so that, for the medium-income class, the ratio of the 
earnings-related pension benefit to the basic pension benefit is 0.777 in Case A. This value 
is estimated using data from the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (2005b). The weight 
coefficient (θ) on the earnings-related pension is adjusted so that the contribution rate (τp) in 
Case A equals the actual rate of 14.29% in employee pension plans (Kosei Nenkin) in 2005.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
4.1 Findings and Policy Implications
4.1.1 Sweden-Type Pension System
In Case A, the public pension program consists of a basic pension and an amount proportional 
to the average annual income from labor for each household. General tax revenue covers 
one third of the basic pension, and contributions cover both the remaining two thirds and the 
overall amount proportional to the income from labor. In moving to the Sweden-type pension 
system (Cases B and C), the income redistribution is performed by a minimum guaranteed 
pension instead of a basic pension. General tax revenue covers the balance, St, between the 
earnings-related pension benefit of the low-income class and the guaranteed pension benefit.
The total amount of the minimum guaranteed pension benefit in Cases B and C is smaller 
than one third of the basic pension in Case A. Therefore, the amount of tax transfer, St, from 
the narrower government sector to the public pension sector decreases to 0.59 in Case B and 
0.58 in Case C (see Table 1). These values are about half of the amount of 1.19 in Case A. 
The total tax revenue, Tt, diminishes from 8.86 in Case A to 8.26 in Case B and 8.25 in Case 
C. Because the tax rate on consumption is adjusted in Case B under tax revenue neutrality, 
7   Okamoto and Tachibanaki (2002) also included the flat basic pension in the public pension program. In that 
study, general tax revenue covered one third of the basic pension in the benchmark simulation, and the rate 
of tax transfer was raised from one third to a half (i.e., there is a rise in the basic pension by one sixth). That 
study examined the effects of an increase in the tax transfer on efficiency and equity.PUBLIC PENSION REFORM IN JAPAN 
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it decreases from 5% to 3.57 % (see Table 2). On the other hand, in Case C, the tax rate on 
interest income is adjusted and thus decreases from 20% to 15.15%.
In this paper the total amount of public pension benefits is kept constant across all simulation 
cases, to eliminate the effects of different sizes on results. The size of the minimum guaranteed 
pension in Cases B and C is substantially smaller than that of the basic pension in Case A. 
It is approximately one sixth the size of the basic pension. This creates a rise in the weight 
coefficient given to the annual income from labor, θ. The coefficient becomes about twice as 
big, increasing from 0.220 in Case A to 0.449 in Case B and 0.444 in Case C. This implies 
that households can receive more pension benefit per unit of their labor supply. As a result, 
the total labor supply, Lt, increases from 141.5 in Case A to 143.3 in Case B and 142.6 in Case 
C. The labor supply of the low-income class, Ll, decreases from 33.17 in Case A to 32.33 in 
Case B and 32.24 in Case C. This is because, irrespective of the level of its labor supply, the 
low-income class can receive the same amount of pension benefit as the medium-income class, 
owing to a minimum guaranteed pension.
In switching to the Sweden-type pension system, the capital stock decreases in Case B 
(361.6→358.0) but it increases in Case C (361.6→374.9). A possible reason for this is as 
follows. In Case B the revenue-neutral tax rate on consumption decreases to 3.57%, and in 
Case C that on interest income decreases to 15.15%. A consumption tax promotes capital 
accumulation more than other tax regimes, whereas an interest income tax hinders capital 
accumulation.8 Thus, the ratio of tax revenue from consumption or interest income to total 
tax revenue determines the level of capital stock.
Social welfare deteriorates from -159.92 in Case A to -160.20 in Case B, where the capital 
stock diminishes. On the other hand, it ameliorates to -159.37 in Case C, where the capital 
stock increases. The move from the current basic pension to the minimum guaranteed pension 
might substantially reduce tax transfer to the pension sector (although it depends on the level 
of the guaranteed pension benefit). The simulation results show that the level of capital stock 
depends crucially on the choice of a tax regime to reduce tax transfer, and that this choice has 
a great influence on the level of social welfare.
4.1.2 Basic Pension and Minimum Guaranteed Pension
In Cases B and C, a minimum guaranteed pension is introduced instead of a basic pension. 
Simultaneously, the size of an earnings-related pension becomes bigger, and thus the weight 
coefficient, θ, is about twice as much as that in Case A. There are the two effects in switching 
from Case A to Cases B and C. Here, we focus on the first effect, and investigate the effects of 
different methods of income redistribution on social welfare. Keeping the weight coefficient, 
θ, the same as in Cases B and C, we consider the case in which a minimum guaranteed 
pension is abolished and a basic pension is introduced. To focus on the comparison with the 
8  Chapter 5 in Okamoto (2004) examined the effects of several tax regimes on capital accumulation, employing 
a simulation model with proportional taxation. That study suggested that the ranking of different methods of 
taxation, according to their strength for promoting capital formation, was: consumption, inheritances, labor 
income, and interest income. Okamoto (2007) showed that, under conditions of revenue neutrality, an increase 
in the tax rate on consumption and a decrease in the tax rate on interest income improves social welfare because 
this combination substantially stimulates capital accumulation. Moreover, Okamoto (2005a) reported that a 
progressive expenditure tax is desirable with regard to both efficiency and equity. AKIRA OKAMOTO
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guaranteed pension, we consider Cases B-1 and C-1 with the basic pension financed by general 
tax revenue. It should be noted that, with regard to size and composition, it is different from 
the current Japanese basic pension in Case A. In Case B-1 the accompanying change in tax 
revenue is adjusted by the tax rate on consumption, whereas in Case C-1 it is adjusted by that 
on interest income (see Table 3).
In the move from Case B to B-1 with a basic pension, the utility of the low-income class 
deteriorates from -62.51 in Case B to -62.70 in Case B-1 (see Table 4). Similarly, in the switch 
from Case C to C-1, the utility decreases from -62.19 in Case C to -62.30 in Case C-1. On the 
other hand, the labor supply of the low-income class increases from 32.33 in Case B to 33.95 in 
Case B-1. Similarly, it increases from 32.24 in Case C to 33.78 in Case C-1. A possible reason 
for this is as follows. Although the low-income class is guaranteed the same amount of pension 
benefit as the medium-income class in Cases B and C, the guarantee disappears in Cases B-1 
and C-1. This fact may give the low-income class an incentive to work. Consequently, in the 
move from Case B to B-1, the total labor supply increases from 143.3 to 144.7 and national 
income increases from 56.6 to 57.1. In the move from Case C to C-1, it increases from 142.6 
to 143.9 and national income increases from 57.2 to 57.8.
The simulation results show that the switch from Cases B and C (with a minimum guaranteed 
pension) to Cases B-1 and C-1 (with a basic pension) improves social welfare. Social welfare 
improves from -160.20 in Case B to -160.08 in Case B-1, and from 159.37 in Case C to -159.11 
in Case C-1. This suggests that the level of social welfare is likely to be higher under a basic 
pension as in present-day Japan than under a minimum guaranteed pension as in the Swedish 
pension system. In particular, Case C-1, where the tax rate on interest income is decreased 
to adjust the accompanying change in tax revenue, generates a higher level of social welfare. 
4.1.3 Cases with only an Earnings-Related Pension
The move from Case A to Cases B and C makes the weight coefficient given to the annual 
income from labor, θ, approximately twice as much. To ascertain the effect of this change on 
the simulation results, we consider two extreme cases, namely, Cases B-2 and C-2. In these 
cases, a minimum guaranteed pension is completely abolished, and thus there exists only an 
earnings-related pension. Intuitively, one would expect the case where there is only an earnings-
related pension to have an advantage with regard to efficiency. However, it has a disadvantage 
with regard to equity, due to the absence of a basic pension or a minimum guaranteed pension 
that fulfills the function of income redistribution. The balance of the merits and demerits 
determines whether the case with only an earnings-related pension improves social welfare.
In Cases B-2 and C-2, there is no tax transfer to the public pension sector. In Case B-2 the 
accompanying change in tax revenue is adjusted by a consumption tax, and in Case C-2 it is 
adjusted by an interest income tax. A fixed scale of public pension across the simulation cases 
gives rise to an increase in the weight coefficient, θ. It increases from 0.449 in Case B-1 to 
0.494 in Case B-2, and from 0.444 in Case C-1 to 0.485 in Case C-2 (see Table 3).
The level of social welfare is lower in Case B-2 with only an earnings-related pension 
(-160.65) than in Case B-1 with a basic pension (-160.08) (see Table 4). Similarly, the level 
of social welfare is lower in Case C-2 with only an earnings-related pension (-159.18) than 
in Case C-1 with a basic pension (-159.11). A low level of social welfare in the cases with PUBLIC PENSION REFORM IN JAPAN 
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only an earnings-related pension is caused mainly by a deterioration of the utility of the low-
income class, because of the absence of income redistribution. The utility of the low-income 
class is lower in Case B-2 (-62.97) than in Case B-1 (-62.70). Similarly, it is lower in Case 
C-2 (-62.36) than in Case C-1 (-62.30).
These results show that, in Cases B-2 and C-2 with only an earnings-related pension, the 
absence of income redistribution through a public pension program produces a decrease in 
the utility of the low-income class, resulting in a deterioration of social welfare. Therefore, 
Cases B-1 and C-1 with a basic pension may be more desirable than Cases B-2 and C-2 with 
only an earnings-related pension.
The effects of Cases B-2 and C-2, with only an earnings-related pension, on capital stock, 
labor supply, and national income are described below. The level of capital stock is lower in 
Case B-2 (355.0) than in Case B-1 (360.0), which could be seen as an unexpected result of 
the simulation. A possible reason for this is as follows. In Case B-2 there exists no tax transfer 
to the pension sector, because of the absence of a basic pension and a minimum guaranteed 
pension. Because the accompanying change in tax revenue is adjusted by a consumption tax, 
the tax rate on consumption is decreased to 2.32%. This implies a shift from a consumption 
tax (that promotes capital formation more than a labor income tax) to a labor income tax (i.e., 
pension contributions). This shift leads to a decrease in capital stock.
On the other hand, the level of capital stock is higher in Case C-2 (385.6) than in Case 
C-1 (380.2). A possible reason for this is as follows. Because, in Case C-2, the accompanying 
change in tax revenue is adjusted by an interest income tax, the tax rate on interest income is 
decreased to 11.12%. This indicates a shift from an interest income tax (that hinders capital 
accumulation more than a labor income tax) to a labor income tax (i.e., contributions). This 
shift creates an increase in capital stock.
Next, with regard to the effects of Cases B-2 and C-2 on labor supply, the absence of income 
redistribution through a public pension scheme gives the low-income class an incentive to 
work. The level of the labor supply of the low-income class is higher in Case B-2 (34.07) than 
in Case B-1 (33.95). Similarly, it is higher in Case C-2 (33.80) than in Case C-1 (33.78). As a 
result, the total labor supply increases in the cases with only an earnings-related pension. The 
level of the total labor supply is higher in Case B-2 (145.2) than in Case B-1 (144.7), whereas 
that of Case C-2 is the same as in Case C-1 (143.9).
Finally, the effects of Cases B-2 and C-2 on national income are described. In the switch 
from Case B-1 to B-2, the capital stock decreases but the total labor supply increases. As 
a result, the level of national income is slightly lower in Case B-2 (57.0) than in Case B-1 
(57.1). In the move from Case C-1 to C-2, the capital stock increases and the total labor supply 
maintains the same level. Thus, the level of national income is higher in Case C-2 (58.0) than 
in Case C-1 (57.8). 
4.1.4 Size of Basic Pension to Maximize Social Welfare
As described above, the level of social welfare is higher in Cases B-1 and C-1 with a basic 
pension than in the benchmark case (A), or in Cases B and C with a minimum guaranteed 
pension, or in Cases B-2 and C-2 with only an earnings-related pension. As the next step, in 
order to explore a desirable public pension program, we choose the size of the basic pension AKIRA OKAMOTO
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to maximize social welfare with regard to Cases B-1 and C-1. In Case B-1* the accompanying 
change in tax transfer to the pension sector is adjusted by a consumption tax, whereas in Case 
C-1* it is adjusted by an interest income tax. The weight coefficient given to the annual income 
from labor, θ, is adjusted to keep the scale of public pension constant across the simulation 
cases (see Table 5).
The simulation results show that, when a change in the tax revenue is adjusted by a 
consumption tax, a larger size of the basic pension (and thus a smaller size of an earnings-
related pension) generates a higher level of social welfare (see Table 6). In other words, Case 
B-1*, where an earnings-related pension is completely abolished and there exists only a basic 
pension, produces the highest level of social welfare (-154.98). In this case, the tax rate on 
consumption rises to 14.06%. This indicates a shift from a labor income tax (i.e., contributions) 
to a consumption tax (that stimulates capital formation more than other tax regimes). As a 
result, capital stock increases substantially, from 360.0 in Case B-1 to 413.9 in Case B-1*. On 
the other hand, the total labor supply is lower in Case B-1* (138.9) than in Case B-1 (144.7), 
which may result mainly from an increase in the basic pension benefit. The level of national 
income is higher in Case B-1* (57.8) than in Case B-1 (57.1).
An increase in the basic pension benefit promotes income redistribution, resulting in a rise 
of the utility of the low-income class. The utility improves from -62.70 in Case B-1 to -60.19 
in Case B-1*. If the basic pension benefit is increased and it is financed by a consumption 
tax, then the policy is desirable with regard to both efficiency and equity. Thus, Case B-1* 
generates the highest level of social welfare.
When the accompanying change in tax revenue is adjusted by an interest income tax, 
Case C-1*, where the size of the basic pension is a little less than twice as much as in Case 
C-1, gives rise to the highest level of social welfare (-159.09). The basic pension benefit 
per representative household, f, increases from 0.0162 in Case C-1 to 0.0303 in Case C-1*. 
Under the assumption of a constant scale of public pension across all the simulation cases, 
the weight efficient, θ, reduces from 0.444 in Case C-1 to 0.410 in Case C-1*. In this case, 
the change in tax revenue is adjusted by an interest income tax. Thus, a smaller size of the 
basic pension creates a lower tax rate on interest income. A decrease in the tax rate stimulates 
capital accumulation, because an interest income tax hinders capital formation more than a 
labor income tax (i.e., contributions). However, lowering the basic pension benefit diminishes 
the utility of the low-income class, which reduces social welfare. Therefore, in this case, with 
regard to efficiency a smaller size of the basic pension is desirable, but with regard to equity 
a larger size is desirable. To balance the two effects, an optimal size for the basic pension 
must be derived.
To summarize, Case B-1*, where the accompanying change in tax revenue is adjusted 
by a consumption tax, produces the highest level of social welfare. If we consider a public 
pension system with the same scale as the current Japanese pension system, it is desirable 
that a public pension system consists of only a basic pension (namely, an earnings-related 
pension is completely abolished) and that it is financed by a consumption tax. Then the basic 
pension benefit is a little less than twice that in the current Japanese system. The basic pension 
benefit per representative household, f, increases from 0.1114 in Case A to 0.2012 in Case 
B-1*. Because the current basic pension benefit for a couple is approximately 130 thousand PUBLIC PENSION REFORM IN JAPAN 
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yen per month, the benefit in Case B-1* would be about 230 thousand yen. In this case, the 
total amount of the basic pension benefit is financed by tax revenue, and thus the tax rate on 
consumption is approximately 14% (and pension contributions are abolished).
4.1.5. Reduction of Minimum Guaranteed Pension Benefit
For simplicity of discussion, in Cases B and C it is assumed that the minimum guaranteed 
pension benefit for the low-income class is equal to the earnings-related pension benefit for the 
medium-income class. This seems to be a sufficient guarantee for the low-income class. When 
the level of the guaranteed pension is lower, the simulation results will change. We conduct 
sensitivity analyses for evaluating the effects of lower guaranteed pensions. With regard to 
Cases B and C, we consider the cases in which the guaranteed pension benefit is decreased 
to 80% of the amount of the pension benefit for the medium-income class. This yields Cases 
B-3 and C-3, respectively.
In Case B-3 the accompanying change in tax revenue is adjusted by a consumption tax, 
and in Case C-3 it is adjusted by an interest income tax (see Table 5). In both cases, a reduction 
of the minimum guaranteed pension benefit reduces social welfare (see Table 6). The level of 
social welfare decreases from -160.20 in Case B to -160.91 in Case B-3, and from -159.37 
in Case C to -159.60 in Case C-3. This result is caused mainly by a decrease in the utility of 
the low-income class. The level of the utility diminishes from -62.51 in Case B to -63.07 in 
Case B-3, and from -62.19 in Case C to -62.53 in Case C-3.
A reduction of the guaranteed pension benefit causes an increase in the labor supply of the 
low-income class. The labor supply increases from 32.33 in Case B to 32.44 in Case B-3, and 
from 32.24 in Case C to 32.28 in Case C-3. Total labor supply increases from 143.3 in Case 
B to 143.6 in Case B-3. Cases C and C-3 have the same level of total labor supply (142.6).
Furthermore, a reduction of the guaranteed pension increases the total assets of the low-
income class, because the households that maximize lifetime utility save more to cover living 
expenses after retirement. The assets increases from 76.45 in Case B to 84.52 in Case B-3, and 
dramatically from 80.74 in Case C to 91.12 in Case C-3. Capital stock diminishes from 358.0 
in Case B to 353.2 in Case B-3. This result is caused mainly by a shift from a consumption 
tax (that promotes capital formation more than a labor income tax) to a labor income tax 
(i.e., contributions). With a reduction of tax transfer to the pension sector, the tax rate on 
consumption decreases from 3.57% in Case B to 2.68% in Case B-3. On the other hand, capital 
stock increases from 374.9 in Case C to 379.9 in Case C-3. This result is caused mainly by a 
shift from an interest income tax (that hinders capital formation more than a labor income tax) 
to a labor income tax (i.e., contributions). With a reduction of the tax transfer, the tax rate on 
interest income diminishes from 15.15% in Case C to 12.25% in Case C-3.
Finally, the effects of Cases B-3 and C-3 on national income are described. The switch from 
Case B to B-3 increases the total labor supply but decreases the capital stock. Consequently, 
national income decreases from 56.6 in Case B to 56.4 in Case B-3. By contrast, the move 
from Case C to C-3 keeps the total labor supply unchanged and increases the capital stock. 
As a result, national income increases from 57.2 in Case C to 57.4 in Case C-3.AKIRA OKAMOTO
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4.2 Comments
The following four comments need to be noted for interpreting the simulation results. First, 
our simulations are limited to the steady states for 2005. Thus, our study lacks a consideration 
of the transitional path. Tax and social security reforms have different effects on different 
generations. Specifically, current and future generations would experience different impacts 
of the reforms.9 Therefore, it is necessary to take account of not only steady states but also 
the transitional process in an aging society.
Second, the simulation model is solved under conditions of the hypothesis of perfect 
foresight. Households correctly anticipate the interest, wage, tax, and contribution rates. 
Without the assumption of perfect foresight, households that maximize their lifetime utility 
would have more assets, resulting in more capital accumulation. As households are more risk 
averse, this effect would be greater.
Third, our simulation model deals only with the unintended bequests consistent with 
uncertainty regarding the length of individual life. Horioka et al. (2000) suggested that 
unintended or strategic bequest motives make up the majority of bequests in Japan. Therefore, 
strategic bequest motives, which are one of intended bequest motives, should also be included 
in the model. 
Finally, because the simulation results are dependent on the given parameters, we must 
be careful about the effects of any parameter changes. In particular, a slight change in the 
parameter of intertemporal elasticity of substitution (γ) has a great affect on capital formation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper examined guidelines for public pension reforms in Japan, using an extended life-
cycle general equilibrium simulation model. The paper investigated a desirable public pension 
system in japan, making reference to the swedish public pension program. In particular, it 
focused on the fact that the swedish scheme consists of an earnings-related pension and a 
minimum guaranteed pension that is financed by general tax revenue.
First, we compared the basic pension in Japan’s current public pension system and the 
minimum guaranteed pension in the Swedish pension system. The simulation results show that 
the switch from a basic pension to a guaranteed pension does not always generate favorable 
results. The switch from a flat basic pension to a minimum guaranteed pension changes the 
amount of tax transfer to the public pension sector. Social welfare depends substantially on 
the choice of the tax regime that will be used to adjust the accompanying changes in tax 
revenue. A higher ratio of tax revenue from consumption to total tax revenue promotes capital 
accumulation and thus improves social welfare, because a consumption tax stimulates capital 
formation more than other tax regimes. On the other hand, a higher ratio of tax revenue from 
9  For example, a change from a labor income tax to a consumption tax creates income transfers among generations 
during the transition. At the onset of policy reform, the elderly who had already paid their labor income tax 
will have to pay an additional consumption tax. Because this generation would suffer from a double burden, 
the transition to a consumption tax is not Pareto improving. As this fact is well known, the conclusion that 
recommends a consumption tax will be required to provide further justification, that is, to suggest measures 
to avoid a double burden during the transition.PUBLIC PENSION REFORM IN JAPAN 
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interest income decreases capital accumulation and thus reduces social welfare, because an 
interest income tax hinders capital formation more than other tax regimes.
Next, this paper compared a basic pension and a minimum guaranteed pension as methods 
of income redistribution through a public pension system. The level of social welfare was 
found to be higher under the case of a basic pension than under that of a minimum guaranteed 
pension. The paper also evaluated a public pension scheme that consists of an earnings-related 
pension only. This scheme did not improve social welfare. This is mainly because the utility 
of the low-income class is too low. Thus, this system has a problem with regard to equity. 
Furthermore, the system did not always promote capital formation, and thus it does not always 
produce favorable results with regard to efficiency either.
Finally, this paper explored a desirable public pension system in Japan. The simulation 
results suggest that, if we consider a public pension system with the same scale as the current 
Japanese pension system, the highest level of social welfare is attained when a public pension 
system consists of only a basic pension (i.e., an earnings-related pension is completely 
abolished) and it is financed by a consumption tax. Then, the basic pension benefit is a little 
less than twice that in the current Japanese system; the current pension amount for a couple is 
approximately 130 thousand yen per month, and thus the amount under this desirable system 
would be about 230 thousand yen. Because the total amount of the basic pension is financed 
by tax revenue (namely, pension contributions are completely abolished), the tax rate on 
consumption rises to approximately 14%.AKIRA OKAMOTO
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Weight coefficient in public 
pension, θ 0.220 0.449 0.444
Minimum guaranteed pension, b 0 0.1785 0.1785
Basic pension per representative 
household,  f 0.1114 0 0
Contribution rate, τp 14.29% 15.96% 15.79%
Tax revenue, Tt  8.86 8.26 8.25
Tax transfer to pension sector, St  1.19 0.59 0.58
Capital stock, Kt 361.6 358.0 374.9
Total labor supply measured per 
effective labor unit, Lt
141.5 143.3 142.6
National income, Yt  56.3 56.6 57.2












Tax rate on labor income,a τw{wxies(1 – li
s)}  7.44% 7.53% 7.65%
Tax rate on consumption, τc 5% 3.57 %b 5%
Tax rate on interest income, τr 20% 20% 15.15%b
Tax rate on inheritances, τh 10% 10% 10%
Interest rate, r  4.67 % 4.74% 4.58%
Wage rate, w 0.260 0.256 0.260
Capital-labor ratio, K/L  2.556 2.499 2.628
(Low) Assets, ASl 79.44 76.45 80.74
(High) Assets, ASh  165.80 160.84 167.99
(Low) Labor supply, Ll 33.17 32.33 32.24
(High) Labor supply, Lh 62.86 64.39 64.05
(Low) Utility,c Ul -62.42 -62.51 -62.19
(High) Utility,cUh -44.66 -44.66 -44.44
Social welfare,c SW -159.92 -160.20 -159.37
a  The rate presented is an average tax rate on labor income. The parameter values that determine the 
tax progressivity on labor income are α = –0.0439, β = 0.52, in all simulation cases.
b  The variable is endogenous.
c  Indexed with a value of 1/10,000. PUBLIC PENSION REFORM IN JAPAN 
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Weight coefficient in 
public pension, θ
0.449 0.494 0.444 0.485
Minimum guaranteed 
pension, b
0 0 0 0
Basic pension per 
representative 
household,  f 
0.0166 0 0.0162 0
Contribution rate, τp 15.97% 17.57% 15.80% 17.22%
Tax revenue, Tt 8.20 7.67 8.19 7.67
Tax transfer to pension 
sector, St
0.53 0 0.52 0
Capital stock, Kt 360.0 355.0 380.2 385.6
Total labor supply 
measured per effective 
labor unit, Lt
144.7 145.2 143.9 143.9
National income, Yt 57.1 57.0 57.8 58.0





















Tax rate on labor income,a
τw{wxies(1–li
s)}
7.53% 7.43% 7.68% 7.64%
Tax rate on consumption, τc  3.29%b 2.32%b 5% 5%
Tax rate on interest income, τr 20% 20% 14.18%b 11.12%b
Tax rate on inheritances, τh  10% 10% 10% 10%
Interest rate, r 4.76% 4.81% 4.56% 4.51 %
Wage rate, w 0.256 0.252 0.260 0.260
Capital-labor ratio, K/L 2.487 2.445 2.642 2.679
(Low) Assets, ASl  86.36 86.40 91.33 93.86AKIRA OKAMOTO
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(High) Assets, ASh  156.93 153.37 165.54 166.51
(Low) Labor supply, Ll 33.95 34.07 33.78 33.80
(High) Labor supply, Lh 64.30 64.52 63.89 63.88
(Low) Utility,c Ul -62.70 -62.97 -62.30 -62.36
(High) Utility,c U  h  -44.53 -44.65 -44.27 -44.27
Social welfare,c SW -160.08 -160.65 -159.11 -159.18
a  The rate presented is an average tax rate on labor income. The parameter values that determine the 
tax progressivity on labor income are α = –0.0439, β = 0.52 in all simulation cases.
b  The variable is endogenous.
c  Indexed with a value of 1/10,000. 
Table 5: Optimal Size for Basic Pension and 






















Weight coefficient in public 
pension, θ
0 0.492 0.410 0.483
Minimum guaranteed 
pension, b
0 0.1428 0 0.1428
Basic pension per 
representative household,  f
0.2012 0 0.0303 0
Contribution rate, τp 0.00% 17.47% 14.57% 17.17%
Tax revenue, Tt  14.11 7.76 8.64 7.76
Tax transfer to pension 
sector, St
6.44 0.09 0.97 0.09
Capital stock, Kt 413.9 353.2 375.1 379.9
Total labor supply 
measured per effective 
labor unit, Lt
138.9 143.6 143.9 142.6
National income, Yt 57.8 56.4 57.5 57.4PUBLIC PENSION REFORM IN JAPAN 
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Tax rate on labor income,a 
τw{wxies(1 – li
s)}
8.64% 7.41% 7.70% 7.61%
Tax rate on consumption, τc 14.06%b 2.68%b 5% 5%
Tax rate on interest income, τr 20% 20% 16.89%b 12.25%b
Tax rate on inheritances, τh 10% 10% 10% 10%
Interest rate, r 4.19% 4.79% 4.60% 4.53%
Wage rate, w 0.291 0.253 0.261 0.260
Capital-labor ratio, K/L 2.981 2.459 2.607 2.665
(Low) Assets, ASl 84.62 84.52 89.01 91.12
(High) Assets, ASh 196.75 153.38 164.55 164.82
(Low) Labor supply, Ll 32.57 32.44 33.77 32.28
(High) Labor supply, Lh 61.63 64.54 63.90 63.98
(Low) Utility,c U  l -60.19 -63.07 -62.27 -62.53
(High) Utility,c Uh -43.55 -44.72 -44.29 -44.38
Social welfare,c SW -154.98 -160.91 -159.09 -159.60
a  The rate presented is an average tax rate on labor income. The parameter values that determine the tax progressivity 
on labor income are α = –0.0439, β = 0.52 in all simulation cases.
b  The variable is endogenous.
c  Indexed with a value of 1/10,000. AKIRA OKAMOTO
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S.E. = 0.07189
R2 = 0.9929 {











Table 9: Estimation of the Age Profile of Earnings Ability
Table 7: Parameter Values used in the Benchmark Simulation
Parameter description Parameter values
Growth rate of successive cohorts 0.00693 = n
New entrants for each income class in period t 1 = t N
Utility weight on leisure 0.8005 = φ
Adjustment coefficient for discounting the future 0.008 − = δ
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 5 . 0 = γ
Intratemporal substitution elasticity 0.9312 = ρ
Share of capital in production 3 . 0 = ε
Scale parameter in production 3 . 0 = B
Government expenditure per representative household 3049 . 0 = g
Compulsory retirement age RE = 61
Starting age for receiving public pension benefit ST = 62
Ratio of the part covered by taxes in the basic pension 3333 . 0 = µ
Basic pension benefit per representative household 0.5532 = f
Weight coefficient of the part proportional to income from labor in 
the public pension 0.2213 = θ
Table 8: Effective Tax Rates for National Income Tax and 
Residence Tax of Wageworkers
Income 
class
Total amount of an-
nual income 
(million yen)
Weight on labor 
endowments
Total amount of an-
nual taxes: national 
income tax and 
residence tax (thou-
sand yen)
Effective tax rates 
(%)
Low 5 7143 . 0 =
l x 177 3.54
Medium 7 x
m =1 418 5.97
High 10 4286 . 1 =
h x 1,041 10.41
Data given are for a couple with two children.




The utility maximization problem over time for each income class in Section 2 is regarded 
as the maximization of equation (2) subject to equations (3) and (8). Below, we consider the 
maximization problem when a retirement age is fixed as RHi. Let the Lagrange function be





 represent the Lagrange multiplier for equations (3) and (8), respectively, and 
superscript i ( = l, m, h) denotes low, medium, and high-income classes, respectively.
The first-order conditions on consumption Cs
i, leisure ls
i, and assets As+1
i  for s = 21,22,ç,95 

















































































i   ,  (A4)
ηs
i 1– ls
i =0  (s Ñ RHi),  (A5)
1– ls
i =0 (s Ñ RHi),  (A6)
ηs
i ≥ 0 .  (A7)
The combination of equations (A2) and (A4) produces equations (9) and (10). If the initial 
value, V21
i , is specified, the value of each age, Vs
i, can be derived from equation (9). If Vs
i is 
specified, the values of consumption, Cs
i, and leisure, ls
i, at each age are obtained in the method 
that follows.








































If the value of ls
i is given under ηs
i =0, the value of Vs
i can be obtained. The value of ls
i is chosen 
so that the value of Vs
i obtained in the simulation is the closest to that calculated by evolution 
from Vs
i through equation (9). If the value of ls
i chosen is unity or higher, the value of Cs
i is 
obtained from equation (10) under ls
i = 1. If it is less than unity, the value of Cs
i is derived from 
equation (A8).
For s = RHi + 1, RHi + 2,ç95, the condition of ls





























The value of Cs
i is chosen to satisfy this equation. 
A.2 Sweden-Type Pension System Case
If the Sweden-type pension program is introduced, then the utility maximization problem in 
the benchmark case is modified as follows.
The first-order condition on leisure ls















































i   (s Ñ RHi),
where zl = 0 and zm = zh = 1.
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APPENDIX B
Section 2 describes the basic structure of households in the simulation model. This appendix 
presents the basic structures of firms and the government, and market equilibrium conditions.
Firm Behaviour
The model has a single production sector that is assumed to behave competitively using capital 
and labor, subject to a constant-returns-to-scale production function. Capital is homogeneous 
and nondepreciating, while labor differs only in its efficiency. All forms of labor are perfect 
substitutes. Households in different income classes or of different ages, however, supply 
different amounts of some standard measure per unit of labor input.




1−ε  ,  (B1)
where Yt is the total output (national income), Kt the total capital, Lt the total labor supply 
measured by the efficiency units, B a scaling constant, and ε is a share of capital. Using the 
property subject to a constant-returns-to-scale production function, we can obtain the following 
equation:
Yt = rKt + wLt.  (B2)
Government Behaviour 
The government sector consists of a narrower government sector and a public pension sector. 
The narrower government sector collects taxes, and spends them on general government 
expenditure and a transfer to the pension sector. There is no outstanding debt, and thus balanced 
budget policies are assumed.
The budget constraint of the narrower government sector at time t is given by
Tt = Gt + μFt,  (B3)
where Tt is the total tax revenue from labor income, interest income, consumption, and 
inheritances, Gt is general government spending on goods and services, except for a transfer 
to the public pension sector, Ft is the total amount of basic pension benefit, and μ is the ratio 
of the part covered by general tax revenues to Ft. 
The budget constraint of the public pension sector at time t is given by
Rt = (1 – μ)Ft + Pt,  (B4)
where Rt is the total contribution to the pension program, and Pt is the total benefit of the part 
proportional to the income from labor. Tt, Gt, Ft, Rt, and Pt are defined by
€ 
Tt = LXt +τ rrASt +τ cACt +τ hBQt  ,  (B5)
€ 
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€ 




∑  ,  (B7)
Rt = τpwLt ,  (B8)
€ 







∑   ,  (B9)





h  .  (B10)
LXt is the tax revenue from labor income, which is represented by 
€ 
































       .
Aggregate variables can be obtained by a simple summation of the three income classes with 
the same weight, because each income group accounts for the same proportion of population. 
Similarly, aggregate assets supplied by households, ASt, and aggregate consumption, ACt, are 
obtained by
€ 







∑   ,  (B12)
€ 







∑   .  (B13)
Market Equilibrium
Finally, equilibrium conditions for the capital, labor, and goods markets are described.
1 Equilibrium condition for the capital market
Because aggregate assets supplied by households are equal to real capital, we get
ASt = Kt .  (B14)
2 Equilibrium condition for the labor market
Measured in efficiency units, because aggregate labor demand by firms is equal to aggregate 
labor supply by households, we get
€ 
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3 Equilibrium condition for the goods market
Because aggregate production is equal to the sum of consumption, investment, and government 
expenditures, we get
Yt = ACt + (Kt+1 – Kt) + Gt  (B16)
An iterative program is performed to obtain the equilibrium values of the above equations.AKIRA OKAMOTO
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